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	 One	of	the	current	constitutional	issues	in	Indonesia	is	the	non-compliance	
of	the	decision	to	immediately	follow	up	the	decision	of	the	Constitutional	
Court,	which	 is	 final.	This	paper	aims	to	analyze	 forms	of	non-compliance	
with	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 and	 create	 a	 model	 that	 is	
expected	to	be	a	solution	to	the	problem.	This	type	of	research	is	 juridical	
normative	 by	 using	 secondary	 data	 processed	 by	 editing	 and	
systematization	 techniques.	 	 The	 results	 showed	 the	 form	 of	 non-
compliance	 of	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 by	 the	 addresat	 of	
the	decision	is	manifested	in	3	(three)	forms,	namely	normative,	praxis,	and	
normative	 and	 praxis	 forms.	 There	 are	 three	 proposed	 state-regulation	
solutions,	 namely	 judicial	 deferral	 by	 limiting	 the	 time	 of	 action,	 re-
affirmation	 of	 judicial	 restraint,	 collaborative	 action,	 and	 collective	
awareness	between	state	institutions.	
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1. Introduction		
Post-reform,	Indonesia	has	expressly	exposed	itself	as	a	country	that	adheres	to	the	
supremacy	of	the	constitution	in	the	state.	Therefore,	the	Constitution	of	the	Republic	
of	Indonesia	of	1945	as	a	form	of	a	written	constitution	in	the	hierarchy	of	legislation	
is	 placed	 on	 the	 highest	 hierarchy.	 The	 consequences	 of	 the	 position	 of	 the	 1945	
Indonesian	Constitution	 as	 the	highest	 law	 cause	 the	 law	not	 allowed	 to	 contradict	
the	 fundamental	 law	 because	 the	 constitutional	 system	 in	 itself	 contains	
constitutional	testing	of	established	norms.1	
Indonesia	established	a	Constitutional	Court	whose	authority	to	test	the	law	against	
the	1945	NRI	Constitution.	 Constitutional	 testing	by	 the	Constitutional	Court	 of	 the	
Republic	of	Indonesia	is	final.	The	final	diction	is	interpreted	as	the	last	of	the	series	
of	examinations.2	According	to	Soemantri,	the	final	award	must	be	binding	and	cannot	
be	 overturned	 by	 any	 institution.3	 Theoretically	 and	 conceptually,	 the	 final	 ruling	
means	that	the	constitutional	Court's	decision	is	the	first	resort	and	the	last	resort	for	
justice	 seekers.4	 Thus,	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 must	 be	 respected	 and	
implemented	by	 the	government	and	other	 state	 institutions	and	society	 in	general	
that	are	bound	by	 the	award	(addressat	verdict).	The	 final	nature	of	 the	decision	of	
the	Court	of	The	Republic	of	Indonesia	is	inseparable	from	the	agreement	to	establish	
the	Court	of	Justice	as	a	judiciary	at	the	first	and	last	level	that	has	consequences	that	
no	legal	mechanism	in	other	courts	can	compare	or	correct	verdict.5		The	background	
of	 the	situation,	making	 the	 intent	of	 the	decision	of	 the	Court	of	 Indonesia	directly	
has	a	binding	legal	force,	and	there	is	no	room	for	efforts	in	making	other	legal	efforts.	
It	 was	 intended	 so	 that	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 can	 resolve	 state	 regulation	 can	
immediately	 provide	 legal	 certainty	 following	 the	 principles	 of	 a	 quick	 and	
straightforward	judiciary.	
 
1	 Maruarar	 Siahaan,	 (2005).	 “Hukum	 Acara	 Mahkamah	 Konstitusi	 Republik	 Indonesia”,	 1st	 Edition.	
Jakarta:	Konstitusi	Press.	p.	4.	
2 Anonymous.	(2001).	“Kamus	Besar	Bahasa	Indonesia”.	Jakarta:	Departemen	Pendidikan	Nasional	dan	
Balai	Pustaka.	p.	317. 
3  Ni’matul	Huda,	 (2018).	 “Kekuatan	Eksekutorial	Putusan	Mahkamah	Konstitusi”.	Yogyakarta:	FH	UII	
Press.	p.	141. 
4 Bambang	 Sutiyoso.	 (2006).	 “Hukum	 Acara	 Mahkamah	 Konstitusi	 Republik	 Indonesia”,	 Cetakan	
Pertama,	Bandung:	PT.	Citra	Aditya	Bakti.	p.	160. 
5 Fajar	 Laksono	 Soeroso.	 (2004).	 "Aspek	 Keadilan	 dalam	 Sifat	 Final	 Putusan	 Mahkamah	 Konstitusi",	
Jurnal	Konstitusi.	11	(1):	77.	
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Given	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 with	 the	 final	 fission,	 it	 becomes	 the	
obligation	of	all	elements	of	the	nation	and	the	state	to	carry	it	out	consequently.	In	
its	development,	compliance	of	state	institutions	in	implementing	the	decision	of	the	
Court	of	Justice	becomes	an	issue.	Against	some	decisions	of	the	Court	of	Justice,	the	
institution	 that	 addressed	 the	 decision	 did	 not	 implement	 and	 even	 ignored	 the	
verdict,	for	example:	first,	the	Decision	of	Constitutional	court	No.	5/PUU-X/2012	on	
the	 testing	 of	 Article	 50	 paragraph	 (3)	 of	 Law	 No.	 20	 of	 2003	 on	 the	 National	
Education	 System.	 Although	 the	 provision	 has	 been	 declared	 unconstitutional,	 the	
government,	 through	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 and	 Culture,	 is	 still	 pursuing	 a	
transitional	 policy	 to	 remove	 the	 policy	 of	 International	 Standard	 Schools	 (SBI)	
and/or	International	School	Pilots	(RSBI).	
Second,	 the	Decision	of	 the	Constitutional	Court	No.	36/PUU-X/2012	concerning	Oil	
and	 Gas	 Cooperation	 Contracts	 in	 which	 the	 position	 of	 the	 Upstream	 Oil	 and	 Gas	
Business	Implementation	Agency	(BP	Migas)	has	been	declared	unconstitutional,	but	
then	 the	 government	 established	 a	 Special	Working	Unit	 for	 Upstream	Oil	 and	 Gas	
Business	Activities	(SKK	Migas)	which	substantively	performs	the	same	functions	as	
BP	 Migas.	 Third,	 the	 Decision	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 No.	 92-PUU-X-2012	
essentially	 makes	 the	 Regional	 Representative	 Council	 equivalent	 to	 the	 President	
and	 the	 House	 of	 Representatives	 in	 the	 state	 of	 submission	 and	 discussion	 of	 the	
draft	law.	Nevertheless,	the	President	and	the	House	of	Representatives	were	ignored	
by	re-ruling	the	Regional	Representative	Council.	 It	was	seen	 in	the	revision	of	Law	
No.	42	of	2014	to	Law	No.	17	of	2014,	in	which	legislators	re-entered	norms	that	have	
been	 declared	 unconstitutional	 by	 the	 Constitutional	 Court.	 Fourth,	 the	 Decision	 of	
the	Constituent	Assembly	No.	34/PUU-XI/2013	essentially	states	that	a	review	can	be	
done	more	than	once.	The	decision	has	revoked	Article	263	paragraph	(3)	of	Law	No.	
8/1981	on	the	Criminal	Procedure	Law.	Fifth,	The	Decision	of	Constitutional	court	No.	
30/PUU-XVI/2018	 requires	 that	 Regional	 Assembly	 senators	 not	 be	 from	 the	
management	 (functionaries)	 of	 political	 parties.	 However,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 in	
Decision	No.	65	P/HUM/2018	ignored	the	decision	of	the	Court	of	Justice.			
Various	 forms	of	non-compliance	with	 the	decision	of	 the	Court	 of	 Justice	 certainly	
can	be	categorized	as	constitutional	compliance	 that	can	 threaten	 the	supremacy	of	
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the	 constitution.6	 	 The	 constitution	or	verfassung	 is	 considered	 the	highest	political	
decision	so	that	the	constitution	has	a	position	or	degree	of	supremacy	in	a	country.	
In	other	words,	the	supremacy	of	the	constitution	is	where	the	supreme	constitution	
position	in	the	rule	of	law	of	a	country.7	
In	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 differentiator	 picture	 of	 existing	 research,	 the	 following	
description	can	be	given:	
1. Firmansyah	Arifin,	 Firmansyah	Arifin,	 Agil	Oktaryal	Andri	Gunawan,	&Erwin	
Natosmal	 Oemar.8	 The	 study,	 focusing	 more	 on	 the	 model	 of	 the	 decision	
decided	by	 the	Court	of	 Justice	and	 the	description	of	 the	 implementation	of	
the	verdict	that	has	been	done	by	addressat	 the	verdict	through	various	laws	
and	regulations.			
2. Novendri	 M.	 Nggilu.9	 	 In	 the	 study,	 there	 is	 one	 subject	 about	 the	 forms	 of	
action	 constitution	 disobedience	 against	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Constitutional	
Court.	 However,	 the	 discussion	 has	 not	mapped	 into	 the	 form	 of	 normative,	
praxis,	 and	 normative	 and	 praxis	 actions	 as	 the	 author	 did.	 In	 addition,	 the	
range	of	decisions	of	the	Court	of	Justice	analyzed	was	also	taken	at	random.	
3. M.	 Agus	 Maulidi.10	 Although	 one	 of	 the	 subjects	 is	 similar,	 but	 the	 sub-
discussion	 is	 actually	 more	 focused	 on	 comparison	 with	 the	 supreme	
constitution	in	other	countries	in	an	effort	to	create	a	final	and	binding	ruling	
on	the	implementative	Indonesian	Court.	
4. Syukri	Asy'ari,	Meyrinda	Rahmawaty	Hilipito,	&	Mohammad	Mahrus	Ali.11	The	
focus	of	 the	 research	 is	on	 the	 characteristics	of	 the	decision	decided	by	 the	
 
6 Jimly	Asshidiqie.	(2012).	“Perkembangan	&	Konsolidasi	Lembaga	Negara	Pasca	Reformasi”,	2nd	edition.	
Jakarta:	Sinar	Grafika.	p.	12. 
7 Parlin	 M.	 Mangunsong.	 (1992).	 ”Konvensi	 Ketatatnegaraan	 Sebagai	 Salah	 Satu	 Sarana	 Perubahan	
UUD”.	Bandung:	Alumni.	p.	22. 
8 Firmansyah	Arifin,	et.al.,	(2019).	“Implementasi	Putusan	Pengujian	Undang-Undang	oleh	Mahkamah	
Konstitusi	2003-2018”.	Jakarta:	Indonesian	Legal	Roundtable. 
9 Novendri	 M.	 Nggilu	 (2019).	 “Menggagas	 Sanksi	 atas	 Tindakan	 Constitution	 Disobedience	 terhadap	
Putusan	Mahkamah	Konstitusi”.	Jurnal	Konstitusi.	16	(1). 
10 M.	 Agus	 Mauldi.	 (2019).	 “Menyoal	 Kekuatan	 Eksekutorial	 Putusan	 Final	 dan	 Mengikat	 Mahkamah	
Konstitusi”.	Jurnal	Konstitusi.	16	(2). 
11 Syukri,	A.,	Meyrind,	R.H.,	Mohammad,	M.A.,	 (2013).	 “Model	dan	 Implementasi	 Putusan	Mahkamah	
Konstitusi	 dalam	 Pengujian	 Undang-Undang	 (Study	 Verdict	 of	 2003-2012)”.	 Jakarta:	 Mahkamah	
Konstitusi	 RI.	 See	 also	 Syukri,	 A.,	 Meyrind,	 R.H.,	 Mohammad,	 M.A.,	 (2015).	 “Tindak	 Lanjut	 Putusan	
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Court	of	Justice	and	the	characteristics	of	its	implementation	are	manifested	in	
the	 following	 form:	a).	 Implementation	of	direct	(self-executing);	b).	Non-self	
executing	implementation.	Thus,	the	study	has	not	discussed	related	solutions	
to	the	decision	of	the	Court	of	Justice	that	is	not	followed	up	by	the	addressat	
of	the	verdict.				
As	for	the	differentiator	in	this	paper,	it	is	as	follows:	1).	The	focus	of	the	study	is	on	
mapping	 the	model	 of	 non-compliance	addressat	 the	 verdict	 on	 the	 decision	 of	 the	
Court	 of	 Justice;	 2).	 This	 study	 systematically	 and	 periodically	 studied	 the	 Court's	
decision	 from	 2013-2018;	 3).	 Model	 or	 solution	 of	 the	 strictness	 of	 the	 non-
compliance	addressat	of	the	award	focused	on	implementing	the	decision	testing	the	
law. 
2. Problem	Statement	
The	 focus	of	 the	 issue	studied	 is	how	 forms	of	non-compliance	with	 the	decision	of	
the	Constitutional	Court	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia	and	how	a	solution	to	the	state	
regulation	 can	 be	 taken	 on	 the	 non-compliance	 of	 state	 institutions	 against	 the	
decision	of	the	Constitutional	Court	of	Indonesia.	
3. Methods	
This	type	of	research	 is	 juridical-normative	research,	so	the	material	used	 is	 library	
material	or	secondary	data	collected	by	tracing	the	decision	of	testing	the	law	by	the	
Constitutional	 Court	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia	 period	 2013-2018,	 which	 Amar	
verdict	is	granted.	Then,	it	is	also	traced	how	the	implementation	of	the	decisions	by	
the	 state	 institutions	 that	 become	addressat.	 The	data	 that	 has	 been	obtained,	 then	
processed	 by:	 1)	 editing,	 namely	 by	 checking	 and	 re-examined	 about	 its	
completeness,	clarity,	and	truth,	to	avoid	deficiencies	and	errors;	2)	systematization,	
namely	 by	 conducting	 the	 preparation	 and	 placement	 of	 data	 on	 each	 subject	
systematically.	As	for	the	analysis	of	the	data,	qualitative	analysis	methods	are	used.	
	
 
Mahkamah	 Konstitusi	 yang	 Bersifat	 Konstitusional	 Bersyarat	 Serta	 Memuat	 Norma	 Baru”,	 Jurnal	
Konstitusi.	12	(3):	653. 
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4.	 	 Forms	 and	 Solutions	 of	 State	 Regulation	 for	 Non-Compliance	 with	 the	
Decision	of	the	Constitutional	Court	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia	
4.1. Non-Compliance	Addressat	Verdict	in	Implementing	the	Decision	of	Testing	
the	 Law	 in	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia	 Period	
2013	-	2018	
The	constitutional	vision	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia	is	to	uphold	the	constitution	to	
realize	the	state	of	 law	and	democracy	for	the	sake	of	a	dignified	national	and	state	
life.	 The	 vision	 became	 a	 guideline	 for	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 in	 exercising	 the	
judiciary's	 power	 that	 it	 held	 independently	 and	 responsibly	 following	 the	
Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia	of	1945.12		Therefore,	it	is	appropriate	that	
every	 decision	 born	 from	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia	 is	
directly	 obeyed	 by	 every	 state	 and	 society,	 especially	 against	 testing	 the	 law.	
According	to	Asshiddiqie,	the	authority	to	test	the	law's	constitutionality	is	precisely	
the	most	important,	without	downplaying	the	importance	of	other	authorities	of	the	
five	authorities	owned	by	the	Constitutional	Court	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia.13	
The	 decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 which	 is	 the	 result	 of	 interpretation	 of	 the	
constitution,	becomes	an	obligation	to	be	obeyed	instead	of	betrayed	by	committing	
insubordination	to	the	verdict.	Submission	to	the	decision	of	the	Constitutional	Court	
of	 Indonesia	will	 indicate	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 state	 based	 on	 the	 line	 of	 the	
constitution	as	the	highest	law.		Concerning	the	obligation	to	obey	the	decision	of	the	
Court	 of	 Justice,	 it	 is	 in	 line	 with	 Jutta	 Limbach's	 opinion	 on	 3	 (three)	 main	
characteristics	that	mark	the	principle	of	constitutional	supremacy,	namely:14	1).	The	
distinction	between	constitutional	 legal	norms	and	other	legal	norms;	2).	Binding	of	
lawmakers	by	the	constitution;	and	3).	There	is	one	institution	that	has	the	authority	
to	test	the	constitutionality	of	government	legal	actions	or	legislators.			
 
12 Bambang	 Sutiyoso.	 (2011).	 “Pembentukan	 Mahkamah	 Konstitusi	 Sebagai	 Pelaku	 Kekuasaan	
Kehakiman	di	Indonesia.”	Jurnal	Konstitusi,	7	(6):	26. 
13 Bachtiar.	 (2015).	 “Problematika	 Implementasi	 Putusan	 Mahkamah	 Konstitusi	 Pada	 Pengujian	 UU	
Terhadap	UUD”.	Jakarta:	Penebar	Swadaya	Grup.	p.	116. 
14 Jutta	Limbach.	(2001).	“The	Concept	of	the	Supremacy	of	the	Constitution”.	The	Modern	Law	Review.	
64	 (1):	 3.	 See	 also	 Fadjar	 L.aksono	 Soeroso,	 et.al.,	 (2013).	 "Implikasi	 dan	 Implementasi	 Putusan	
Mahkamah	Konstitusi	Nomor	5/PUU-X/2012	tentang	SBI	atau	RSBI".	Jurnal	Konstitusi.	10	(4):	p.	741. 
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In	other	words,	if	there	is	a	state	institution	that	does	not	implement	or	even	overturn	
the	decision	of	the	Constitutional	Court,	then	just	as	the	state	institution	has	ruled	out	
the	constitution	as	the	highest	law	in	the	state.	Nevertheless,	the	research	conducted	
by	the	authors	shows	that	there	are	still	some	constitutional	court	rulings	that	are	not	
obeyed.	Based	on	the	results	of	the	mapping	conducted	by	the	author,	there	is	a	form	
of	non-compliance	with	the	decision	of	the	Constitutional	Court	that	is	manifested	in	
various	 forms	 as	 follows:	 first,	 non-compliance	 with	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	
Justice	in	the	form	of	normative.	This	form	of	non-compliance	manifested	in	the	form	
of	follow-up	to	the	legislation.	Second,	non-compliance	with	the	decision	of	the	Court	
of	Justice	in	the	form	of	praxis.	In	this	aspect,	the	form	of	indifference	is	manifested	in	
state	 practice	 in	 both	 the	 executive,	 legislative	 and	 judicial	 domains	 or	 practices	 in	
local	 government.	 Third,	 non-compliance	 with	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Constitutional	
Court	in	the	form	of	normative	and	praxis.	This	dimension	illustrates	that	not	only	not	
obeyed	in	terms	of	normative	but	at	the	praxis	level,	the	decision	of	the	Constitutional	
Court	is	also	not	obeyed.	
Concerning	the	form	of	non-compliance	with	the	decision	of	the	Constitutional	Court	
in	the	normative	form,	among	others	seen	in	the	decision	of	the	Constitutional	Court	
as	follows:	
1) Decision	 of	 Constitutional	 court	 No.	 95/PUU-XIV/2016.	 The	 decision	 of	 this	
Court	 states	 that	 the	 right	 to	 organize	 Special	 Education	 of	 Profession	
Advocates	 is	 an	 advocacy	 organization.	 However,	 in	 the	 Regulation	 of	 the	
Minister	 of	 Research,	 Technology,	 and	 Higher	 Education	 No.	 5	 of	 2019	
concerning	The	Advocate	Profession	Program,	 it	determines	 the	organizer	of	
PKPA	is	Higher	Education.	
2) Decision	 of	 Constitutional	 court	 No.	 39/PUU-XIV/2016.	 The	 essence	 of	 the	
ruling,	 the	 Court	 stated	 that	 "basic	 goods	 that	 are	 needed	by	 the	 people	 are	
much	needed"	in	the	Explanation	of	Article	4A	paragraph	(2)	letter	b	law	No.	
42	 of	 2009	 should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 limitatively.	 Against	 the	 ruling,	 in	
Government	Regulation	No.	145	of	2000	jo.	Government	Regulation	No.	12	of	
2006	concerning	Group	of	Taxable	Goods	Classified	as	Luxury	Subject	to	Sales	
Tax	on	Luxury	Goods	has	not	adjusted	 to	 the	decision	of	 the	Court	of	 Justice	
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because	 it	 still	 includes	 essential	 goods	 that	 the	 people	 need	 are	 still	
interpreted	limitatively.	
Moreover,	the	non-compliance	of	the	decision	of	the	Court	of	Indonesia	in	the	form	of	
normative	is	seen	in	1).	The	decision	of	Constitutional	court	No.	88/PUU-XIV/2016	is	
normatively	 not	 adhered	 to	 in	 local	 regulations;	 2).	 The	 decision	 of	 Constitutional	
court	No.	8/PUU-XIII/2015	is	normatively	not	adhered	to	in	the	form	of	government	
regulations;	 3).	 The	 decision	 of	 Constitutional	 court	 No.	 19/PUU-XII/2014	 is	
normatively	not	adhered	to	in	the	form	of	government	regulations;	4).	The	decision	of	
Constitutional	 court	 No.	 82/PUU-XII/2014	 is	 normatively	 not	 adhered	 to	 in	 the	
amendment	of	the	law;	5).	The	decision	of	Constitutional	court	No.	83/PUU-XI/2013	
is	normatively	not	adhered	 to	 in	 the	 form	of	 law;	6).	The	decision	of	Constitutional	
court	 No.	 34/PUU-XI/2013,	 which	 is	 normatively	 a	 form	 of	 non-compliance,	 is	
manifested	in	the	form	of	a	Circular	Letter	of	the	Supreme	Court;	7).	The	decision	of	
Constitutional	court	No.	3/PUU-XI/2013	is	normatively	not	adhered	to	in	the	form	of	
law,	and	8).	The	decision	of	Constitutional	court	No.	1/PUU-XI/2013	 is	normatively	
not	 adhered	 to	 in	 the	 form	 of	 revision	 of	 the	 law.	 Meanwhile,	 concerning	 non-
compliance	 with	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 in	 the	 form	 of	 practice,	
among	others,	namely:		 	
1) The	decision	of	 the	Constitutional	Court	No.	77/PUU-XIV/2016.	The	decision	
of	the	Constitutional	Court	states	the	phrase	"can	be	reappointed"	in	Article	33	
of	 Law	 No.	 14	 of	 2008	 on	 Public	 Information	 Disclosure	 is	 conditionally	
contrary	to	the	1945	NRI	Constitution	and	does	not	have	binding	legal	force	as	
long	 as	 it	 is	 not	 interpreted	 as	 "re-elected	 through	 a	 selection	 process	 as	
stipulated	 in	 Article	 30	 and	 Article	 32	 of	 Law	 No.	 14	 of	 2008	 on	 Public	
Information	 Disclosure".	 Against	 the	 verdict,	 not	 obeyed,	 for	 example,	 seen	
related	 to	 the	 second	 period	 of	 the	 Gorontalo	 Information	 Committee	
members,	which	was	not	done	through	open	selection.	However,	the	Governor	
of	 Gorontalo	 only	 issued	 Decree	 No.	 323/11/VIII/2015	 concerning	 the	
Appointment	 of	 Members	 of	 the	 Gorontalo	 Information	 Committee	 Period	
2015-2019,	 dated	 August	 13,	 2015.	 The	 decree	 also	 sued	 the	 State	
Administrative	Court.	However,	the	final	verdict	at	the	cassation	level	rejected	
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the	lawsuit	(Case	Verdict	No.	287	K/TUN/2017,	dated	August	1,	2017).	Thus,	
members	of	the	Gorontalo	Province	KI	were	reappointed	for	a	second	period	
without	a	selection	process.	The	form	of	non-compliance	is	manifested	praxis	
in	administering	the	state	and	the	judicial	process/court	decisions.	
2) Decision	 of	 Constitutional	 court	 No.	 30/PUU-XVI/2018.	 This	 ruling	
Constitutional	 court	 states	 the	 phrase	 "other	work"	 in	Article	 182	 letter	 l	 of	
Law	No.	7	of	2017	on	Elections.	The	form	of	non-compliance	with	the	decision	
of	the	Court	of	 Justice,	as	evidenced	in	the	Supreme	Court	of	The	Republic	of	
Indonesia	 No.	 65	 P/HUM/2018,	 actually	 canceled	 the	 Election	 Commission	
Regulation	 No.	 26/2018.	 Thus	 the	 form	 of	 non-compliance	 is	 manifested	
praxis	in	the	process	or	court	decision.	
Then,	concerning	non-compliance	with	the	decision	of	the	Court	of	Justice	in	the	form	
of	normative	and	praxis	are	as	follows:	first,	the	Decision	of	Constitutional	court	No.	
61/PUU-XV/2017	and	66/PUU-XV/2017.	The	two	decisions	of	the	Indonesian	Court	
of	Justice	essentially	reaffirmed	the	institutional	existence	of	elections	in	Aceh,	which	
is	special	in	the	form	of	the	Independent	Commission	for	Elections	of	Aceh	Province,	
the	 Independent	 Commission	 for	 District/Municipal	 Elections,	 the	 Aceh	 Provincial	
Election	 Supervisory	 Committee,	 and	 the	 District/Municipal	 Election	 Supervisory	
Committee.	 Non-compliance	 in	 terms	 of	 normative,	 seen	 in	 the	 Regulation	 of	 the	
Election	Supervisory	Board	(Perbawaslu)	No.	10	of	2018	concerning	Amendments	to	
The	 Regulation	 of	 the	 Election	 Supervisory	 Board	 No.	 19	 of	 2017.	 The	 essence	 of	
Election	 Supervisory	Regulation,	 equating	 election	 organizers	 in	Aceh	with	 election	
organizers	 in	other	regions.	Then	non-compliance	in	 its	praxis	 is	through	Letter	No.	
0214	/	BAWASLU	/	SJ	/	HK.01.00	/	IV	/	2018	dated	April	12,	2018,	which	appoints	
the	 Election	 Supervisory	 Committee	 Aceh	 recruited	 and	 selected	 by	 Indonesian	
Election	Supervisory	Body.	The	decision	of	 the	 Indonesian	Court	of	 Justice	confirms	
that	 Election	 Supervisory	 Committee	 was	 proposed	 by	 the	 DPRA/DPRK	 following	
Article	44	to	Article	47	of	Qanun	Aceh	Number	6	of	2016	concerning	The	Organizers	
of	 Elections	 and	 Elections	 in	 Aceh	 junction	 Article	 60	 of	 Law	 No.	 11/2016	 of	 the	
Government	of	Aceh.	
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Second,	The	Decision	of	Constitutional	court	No.	10/PUU-XV/2017.	This	ruling	states	
Article	 14	 paragraph	 (1)	 letter	 a	 law	 No.	 29	 of	 2004	 concerning	 Medical	 Practice	
which	 states	 "The	 number	 of	 members	 of	 the	 Indonesian	 Medical	 Council	 17	
(seventeen)	persons	consisting	of	elements	derived	from:	(a)	the	organization	of	the	
medical	profession	2	(two)	people;	 ..."	contrary	to	the	1945	Indonesian	Constitution	
and	does	not	have	binding	 legal	 force	as	 long	as	the	element	of	"medical	profession	
organization"	 is	 not	 interpreted	 as	 not	 being	 the	 administrator	 of	 the	 medical	
professional	organization.	
Against	the	ruling,	there	has	been	no	follow-up	from	the	Government	and	parliament	
to	 revise	 the	 Law.	 In	 addition,	 there	 has	 been	 no	 revision	 to	 the	 Regulation	 of	 the	
Indonesian	Medical	Council	No.	1	of	2011	concerning	the	Organization	and	Working	
Procedure	 of	 the	 Indonesian	 Medical	 Council,	 which	 includes	 a	 clause	 on	 the	
prohibition	of	Indonesian	Health	Commission	members	from	elements	of	Indonesian	
Doctor	 Association	 or	 other	 medical	 professional	 organizations.	 Meanwhile,	 until	
now,	 Indonesian	 Health	 Commission	 membership	 still	 consists	 of	 17	 (seventeen)	
people,	including	the	Indonesian	Doctors	Association.	
The	verdict	of	the	Court	that	is	not	adhered	to	normatively	and	other	praxis,	namely:	
1).	 Decision	 Constitutional	 court	 No.	 100/PUU-XI/2013;	 2).	 The	 decision	 of	
Constitutional	 court	No.	27/PUU-XI/2013.	Normatively,	 until	 now,	no	 changes	have	
been	made	to	the	regulation.	Meanwhile,	the	Indonesian	House	of	Representatives	as	
the	 state	 organizer,	 followed	 up	 inconsistently.	 	 For	 example,	 on	 May	 21,	 2019,	
Commission	III	of	the	House	of	Representatives	rejected	all	supreme	court	nominees	
proposed	by	the	Judicial	Commission.	 	However,	on	July	11,	2018,	Commission	III	of	
the	House	approved	two	supreme	court	justices	proposed	by	the	Judicial	Commission.			
4.2. State	 Regulation	 Solution	 for	 Non-Compliance	 Addressat	 Decision	 in	
Implementing	 State	 the	 Decision	 testing	 the	 Law	 of	 the	 Indonesian	
Constitutional	Court	Period	2013-2018	
Various	scientific	treasures	have	explained	that	the	decision	of	the	Court	of	Justice	is	
final	so	that	there	is	no	other	legal	effort	to	eliminate	it.	The	final	meaning	in	Article	
24C	 paragraph	 (1)	 of	 the	 1945	 NRI	 Constitution	 does	 give	 rise	 to	 pros	 and	 cons.	
According	to	Dahlan	Thaib,	every	final	verdict	should	also	be	binding	and	cannot	be	
 
127 http://ejurnal.ung.ac.id/index.php/jalrev/																																																										JALREV	3	Special	Issue	2021	
repeated.	Not	clearly	mentioning	the	binding	clause	in	a	final	ruling	would	ultimately	
result	in	a	floating	Constitutional	Court	ruling.15	However,	according	to	most	experts,	
the	word-final	means	binding.	Maruarar	Siahaan	said	that	the	final	first	and	final	level	
of	 the	verdict	obtained	a	permanent	 legal	 force	since	 it	was	pronounced	 in	a	public	
open	hearing	that	is	erga	omnes,	which	is	a	ruling	that	the	legal	consequences	bind	all	
parties.16	
Apart	 from	the	 final	diction	debate	of	 the	verdict,	 in	principle,	non-compliance	with	
the	 decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 is	 also	 the	 same	 as	 delaying	 the	 realization	 of	
justice	 (justice	delayed)	or	as	a	rejection	of	 the	existence	of	 justice	 (justice	denied).	
Erwin	 Chemerinsky	 said	 that	 justice	 that	 is	 postponed	 could	 be	 a	 justice	 that	 is	
rejected,	and	in	its	development,	there	is	no	way	to	predict	the	consequences	that	can	
occur	because	of	 this	delay.17	 Based	on	 that,	 then	 implementing	 the	decision	of	 the	
Court	 of	 Justice	 immediately	 is	 an	 obligation	 because	 of	 the	 final	 nature	 of	 the	
decision	as	soon	as	the	implementation	of	the	verdict,	will	also	hasten	the	presence	of	
certainty,	 usefulness,	 and	 justice	 of	 the	 constitution.	 In	 addition,	 that	 the	 law	 is	 a	
combination	of	consensus	and	coercion.18	Therefore,	the	decision	of	the	Court	of	Law	
which	is	a	form	of	law	must	also	be	interpreted	as	a	compulsion	that	must	be	obeyed.				
Obedience	to	the	decision	of	the	Court	of	Justice	is	an	absolute	step	considering	that	
the	state	has	agreed	to	make	the	constitution	the	supreme.	It	is	said	that	considering	
the	 decision	 of	 the	Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	Republic	 of	 Indonesia	 stemmed	 from	 the	
constitution	and	interpretation	of	the	articles	in	the	1945	NRI	Constitution.	Then,	the	
legislator	 (The	 House	 and	 President)	 must	 submit	 to	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	
Justice	 because	 there	 is	 a	 principle	 that	 should	 be	 firmly	 denied	 by	 it,	 namely	 the	
principle	of	self-respect	or	self-obedience.	The	content	of	the	meaning	of	the	principle	
can	be	interpreted	state	organizers	must	respect	the	decision	of	the	Court	of	 Justice	
because	there	are	no	known	coercive	efforts	directly	through	bailiffs	as	is	the	case	in	
 
15 Dahlan	 Thaib.	 (2009).	 “Ketatanegaan	 Indonesia	 Perspektif	 Konstitusional”.	 1st	 Edition.	 Yogyakarta:	
Total	Media.	p.	255. 
16 Maruarar	Siahaan.	(2009).	"Peran	Mahkamah	Konstitusi	Dalam	Penegakan	Hukum	Konstitusi”,	Jurnal	
Hukum.	3	(16):	359. 
17 Erwin	 Chemerinsky.	 (1997).	 “Justice	 Delayed	 is	 Justice	 Denied”.	Berkeley	 Journal	 of	 International	
Law.	11	(2):	24. 
18 Ahmad	 Ali	 dan	 Wiwie	 Heryani.	 (2012).	 “Menjelajahi	 Kajian	 Empiris	 Terhadap	 Hukum”.	 Jakarta:	
Pranada	Media	Grup.	p.	68. 
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civil	 legal	 procedures.19	 For	 this,	 the	 author	 tries	 to	 suggest	 several	 constitutional	
efforts	 to	 realize	 compliance	with	 the	decision	of	 the	Court	of	 Justice.	The	 forms	of	
constitutional	efforts	are	as	follows:	
1. Delaying	the	Binding	Power	of	the	Award	(Judicial	Deferral)	by	Limiting	
the	Time	of	Necessity	of	Action	
The	 meaning	 of	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 The	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia	 is	 final,	
meaning	 that	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 The	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia	 obtains	 a	
permanent	legal	force	since	it	has	been	pronounced	in	a	plenary	session	that	is	open	
to	the	public	so	that	since	then	the	verdict	must	be	implemented.	The	interpretation	
of	the	nature	of	the	decision	of	the	Court	of	The	Republic	of	Indonesia,	certainly	not	
always	consistent	considering	de	facto	there	is	a	decision	of	the	Court	of	Justice	that	
takes	 time	 to	 follow	 up.	 The	 need	 for	 such	 time	 then	 means	 delaying	 the	 binding	
power	 and	 its	 enforceability	 (judicial	 deferral).	 Against	 this,	 is	 it	 justifiable?	 In	
practice,	 delaying	 the	binding	power	and	 the	 enforceability	of	 judicial	 deferrals	 are	
enforced	in	several	countries	such	as	Italy,	Germany,	Austria,	Romania,	South	Korea,	
and	even	the	Constitutional	Court.20	
The	practice	 of	 judicial	 deferral	 is	 thus	 considered	 effective	 because	 the	 institution	
addressat	 the	 award	has	 time	 to	prepare	 the	procedure	of	 follow-up	of	 the	 verdict.	
However,	 delays	 are	 certainly	 not	 without	 time	 limits.	 The	 constitutional	 judiciary	
must	still	give	a	 time	 limit	on	a	norm	that	has	been	canceled	until	when	 it	 remains	
valid	for	later	follow-up	by	the	legislator.	Thus,	the	constitutional	 judiciary	does	not	
provide	blank	checks	that	give	the	legislators	free	interpretation	on	the	right	time	to	
follow	up.	
Departing	from	the	thought	of	delaying	the	verdict,	 the	Court	of	 Justice	may	do	it	 in	
order	 to	 ensure	 the	 House	 or	 the	 President	 follows	 up	 the	 decision.	 However,	 the	
delay	of	the	verdict	must	be	accompanied	by	a	time	limit.	That	is,	for	example,	in	the	
Decision	 of	 Constitutional	 court.	 No.	 4/PUU-XI/2013	 concerning	 implementing	
 
19 Aan	 Eko	 Widiarto.	 (2015).	 “Ketidakpastian	 Hukum	 Kewenangan	 Lembaga	 Pembentuk	 Undang-
Undang	Akibat	Pengabaian	Putusan	Mahkamah	Konstitusi”.	Jurnal	Konstitusi.	12	(4):	736.	
20 Bisariyadi.	 (Ed.	 Februari,	 2017).	 “Politik	 Penundaan	 Pelaksanaan	 Putusan	 Atas	 Nama	 Demokrasi”.		
Majalah	Konstitusi:	74-76. 
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presidential	 thresholds	 that	 must	 be	 used	 for	 general	 elections	 in	 2019.	 For	 that	
reason,	 before	 implementing	 the	 2019	 Elections,	 the	 legislator	 followed	 it	 up	 by	
making	it	a	material	content	in	Law	No.	7	of	2017	on	Elections.	
In	order	to	confirm	the	delay	of	the	decision	accompanied	by	time	limitation,	one	of	
them	can	be	done	by	adding	a	formulation	of	new	norms	through	the	amendment	of	
Law	No.	 23	 of	 2004	 jo.	 Law	No.	 7	 of	 2020	 on	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 (Law	of	 the	
Constitutional	Court),	which	essentially	gives	the	possibility	to	the	Court	of	Indonesia	
to	 order	 the	 postponement	 of	 binding	 power	 and	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 decision	
accompanied	by	the	limitation	of	the	time	of	follow-up.	If	it	is	felt	that	there	is	no	need	
to	make	changes	to	the	Law	quo,	then	in	the	future	in	the	decision,	the	Court	of	Justice	
must	include	a	deadline	for	the	implementation	of	the	award	within	a	certain	period	
of	months	or	years.	 In	other	words,	 the	 judge	of	the	Court	of	 Justice	can	specifically	
include	the	deadline	for	the	implementation	of	the	verdict.	
2. Re-Edification	of	Judicial	Restraint	
The	concept	of	judicial	restraint	has	the	spirit	to	separate	the	judiciary	professionally	
from	the	branches	of	power	of	other	countries	to	make	the	 judicial	body	back	to	 its	
original	 function,	 namely	 to	 adjudicate	 or	 decide	 cases.	 The	 reason	 for	 judicial	
restraint	 is	 that	 the	 judiciary	 can	 easily	 create	 a	 policy	 model	 because	 it	 modifies	
existing	 policies	 (inkrementalis).21	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 refrain	 from	 freely	
deciding	things.	
Through	 judicial	 restraint,	 it	wants	 the	Court	 of	 Indonesia	 to	 return	 to	 the	 original	
state	of	the	original	formed	as	negative	legislators,	not	as	a	norm-forming	institution	
(positive	legislators)	which	parliamentary	institutions	play.22	It	should	be	pointed	out	
that	judicial	restraint	does	not	mean	that	the	judiciary	should	not	or	refuse	to	test	a	
law,	 but	 rather	 when	 and	 for	 what	 issue	 the	 judiciary	 should	 refrain	 from.	 The	
 
21 M.Irfan	Islamy	(2000).	“Prinsip-Prinsip	Perumusan	Kebijakan	Negara”.	Jakarta:	Bumi	Aksara.	p.	64-65. 
22 According	 to	Bugaric,	 positive	 legislatures	 are	portrayed	by	parliament,	while	 negative	 legislative	
models	are	portrayed	by	the	constitutional	court..	See	Bojan	Bugaric.	(2001).	“Courts	as	Policy	Makers:	
Lessons	from	Transition”,	Harvard	International	Law	Journals.	42	(3):	256. 
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judiciary	must	measure	the	degree	of	authority	it	has	as	a	parameter	of	when	to	act	
and	when	to	refrain.23	
How	 should	 the	 Court	 of	 Indonesia	 refrain	 (self-restraint)	 in	 carrying	 out	 its	
authority?	 then	 can	 learn	 from	 the	 Decision	 of	 Constitutional	 Court	 No.	 73/PUU-
XII/2014	 related	 to	 the	 testing	 of	 Article	 84,	 Article	 97,	 Article	 104,	 Article	 109,	
Article	 115,	 Article	 121,	 and	 Article	 152	 of	 Law	No.	 17	 of	 2004	 concerning	 People	
Consultative	 Assembly,	 the	 House	 of	 Representatives,	 Regional	 Representative	
Council,	and	Regional	People's	Representative	Assembly.	The	essence	of	the	matter	is	
to	question	the	filling	of	the	House	leadership,	which	is	considered	detrimental	to	the	
applicant.	 The	 decision,	 rejected	 by	 the	 Court	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 1)	 Article	 19	
paragraph	(2)	of	the	1945	Constitution,	determines	that	the	composition	of	the	House	
of	Representatives	is	regulated	by	law.	According	to	the	Court,	it	means	that	how	the	
organization	 including	 the	mechanism	of	 the	 election	 of	 its	 leadership	 is	 the	 policy	
area	of	the	legislator	to	regulate	it;	2)	the	mechanism	of	the	election	of	the	chairman	
of	the	House	of	Representatives	and	the	fittings	of	the	House	of	Representatives	is	an	
open	 legal	 policy	 (opened	 legal	 policy)	 of	 the	 legislator	 that	 is	 not	 contrary	 to	 the	
1945	Constitution.	
For	 example,	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 has	 built	 a	 paradigm	 that	 not	 all	 law	 provisions	
considered	not	by	the	1945	Constitution	should	be	annulled.	Indonesia	Constitutional	
court	 wisely	 and	 wisely	 recognizes	 that	 certain	 problems	 (testing	 laws),	 more	
appropriate	if	resolved	through	the	organ	of	the	legislator.	Therefore,	the	Indonesian	
Constitutional	Court	refers	to	it	as	opened	legal	policy.	In	other	words,	the	ruling	is	a	
form	of	self-restraint	Indonesian	Constitutional	court	so	as	not	to	enter	or	exceed	the	
authority	that	the	legislator	owns.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 judicial	 restraint	 is	 not	 purely	 about	 making	 the	
judiciary	unable	or	refusing	to	test	a	law.	The	Court	of	Justice	can	still	test	the	law	by	
"exiting"	 from	patron	 judicial	 restraint	when	 faced	with	 testing	 laws	 that	meet	 the	
following	criteria:	1)	violate	morality,	rationality	and	intolerant	 injustice;	2)	the	law	
 
23 Bisariyadi.	(2015).	“Yudisialisasi	Politik	dan	Sikap	Menahan	Diri:	Peran	Mahkamah	Konstitusi	dalam	
Menguji	Undang-Undang”.	Jurnal	Konstitusi,	12	(3):	488.	
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tested	 if	 not	 progressively	 decided	will	 cause	 institutional	 problems	 in	 the	 form	 of	
unenforceable,	 the	 rules	 cause	 a	 deadlock	 and	 impede	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	
performance	 of	 the	 state	 institution	 concerned	 which	 ultimately	 causes	 a	 loss	 of	
constitutionality	 of	 citizens;	 and	 3)	 laws	 whose	 content	 material	 exceeds	 the	
provisions	of	the	limitations	that	have	been	determined	specifically,	 imitatively,	and	
expressly	clearly	in	the	1945	Indonesian	Constitution.	
3. Collaborative	 Action	 and	 Collective	 Awareness	 Development	 between	
State	Institutions	
It	has	become	a	common	understanding	that	the	normative	provisions	of	the	decision	
of	the	Court	of	Indonesia	that	has	the	final	consequences	must	be	obeyed.	However,	
the	 normative	 clause,	 of	 course,	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 verdict	 will	 be	
followed	up	in	a	plenary	manner	by	the	institution	addressat	the	verdict.	That	means	
that	the	final	verdict	 is	not	a	variable	that	can	stand	on	its	own.	In	other	words,	the	
decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 should	 not	 be	 considered	 an	 independent	 variable	
because	 it	 will	 be	 counter-productive	 for	 the	 implementation	 process	 of	 the	 final	
decision.	Suppose	 the	decision	of	 the	Court	of	 Justice	 is	only	completed	on	 the	 final	
normative	 backrest.	 In	 that	 case,	 it	 indicates	 that	 the	 final	 ruling	 tends	 to	 be	
understood	only	as	a	pure	 legal	 ruling.	At	 the	 same	 time,	when	 the	Court	of	 Justice	
reads	a	final	ruling,	the	Indonesian	Constitutional	court	needs	political	institutions	to	
follow	 up.	 The	 background	 of	 the	 situation	 led	 to	 efforts	 to	 carry	 out	 two	 actions,	
namely	 collaborative	 action	 between	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	with	 all	 state	 institutions	
and	 the	 development	 of	 collective	 awareness	 of	 the	 position	 of	 the	 decision	 of	 the	
Court	of	Indonesia	as	a	form	of	interpretation	of	the	constitution.	
First,	 collaborative	action	between	 the	 Indonesian	Constitutional	 court	and	all	 state	
institutions.	 The	 Indonesian	 Constitutional	 court	 should	 conduct	 collaborative	
cooperation	 between	 state	 institutions	 or	 strengthen	 mutual	 interdependence	
between	the	House	and	the	President	as	a	partner	state	organ	given	the	mandate	to	
follow	up	the	decision	of	the	Court	of	Representatives.	In	order	to	strengthen	mutual	
interdependence	between	the	House	of	Representatives	and	the	President,	intensive	
cooperation	 across	 state	 institutions	 driven	 by	 the	 Indonesian	 Court	 must	 be	
 
132 http://ejurnal.ung.ac.id/index.php/jalrev/																																																										JALREV	3	Special	Issue	2021	
conducted.	 That	 is,	 Constitutional	 court	 is	 expected	 to	 establish	 synergistic	
coordination	between	the	countries	implementing	the	verdict.		
The	 second	 step	 is	 the	 development	 of	 collective	 awareness	 of	 the	 position	 of	 the	
decision	of	the	Court	of	Indonesia	as	a	form	of	interpretation	of	the	constitution.	The	
decision	of	the	Court	of	The	Republic	of	Indonesia	is	a	product	of	the	interpretation	of	
the	constitution.	Therefore,	 there	should	be	no	state	 institutions	that	bargain	not	 to	
act	 on	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 The	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia.	 It	 should	 be	 an	
understanding	and	a	collective	awareness	of	other	state	institutions	that	the	decision	
of	 the	Court	of	 Justice	 carries	 a	 constitutional	mandate	 so	 that	 the	 follow-up	 to	 the	
decision	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 must	 be	 done	 properly	 and	 immediately.	 If	 the	
collective	understanding	has	been	awakened,	 the	actual	 follow-up	to	the	decision	of	
the	Court	of	Representatives	is	not	solely	binding	on	the	House	of	Representatives	or	
the	 President.	 However,	 it	 has	 a	 dimension	 of	 obligation	 that	 must	 be	 carried	 out	
collectively	by	other	state	institutions.	
5. Conclusion	
The	form	of	non-compliance	by	the	addressat	of	the	verdict	against	the	decision	of	the	
Court	 of	 The	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia	 manifested	 in	 3	 (three)	 forms	 that	 have	 not	
adhered	 to	 normatively,	 not	 obeyed	 praxis	 and	 not	 adhered	 to	 normatively	 and	
praxis.	As	a	solution	to	the	state	regulation,	the	following	is	proposed:	1).	Delaying	the	
binding	power	of	the	award	(judicial	deferral),	but	by	limiting	the	time	of	follow-up	of	
the	verdict;	2).	Re-affirmation	of	 judicial	 restraint,	namely	 the	Court	of	 Justice	must	
always	 position	 itself	 as	 a	 negative	 legislator,	 but	 under	 certain	 circumstances,	 the	
Court	of	 Justice	 can	act	as	a	 legislator	 (positive	 legislators);	 and	3).	The	 Indonesian	
Constitutional	 court	 can	 collaborate	 with	 state	 institutions	 to	 build	 a	 common	
awareness	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 final	 decision	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia	 is	 a	
constitutional	interpretation	that	must	be	obeyed.			
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